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In this article the author examines the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska. He discusses the
implications the decision has for western states' attempts to control
their water resources and suggests a revision in the Court's approach
to such questions.

SO ITS NOT "OURS" - WHY CAN'T
WE STILL KEEP IT? A FIRST LOOK
AT SPORHASE V. NEBRASKA
By
A. Dan Tarlock*
INTRODUCTION: THE ORIGINS OF
WESTERN CLAIMS OF RESOURCE SOVEREIGNTY

With one exception, God was good to the West. He
gave it great natural beauty (accentuated by some vast,
barren stretches), abundant and varied natural resources,
and substantial areas of productive soil. However, he failed
to provide enough water to enjoy and exploit these gifts
with abandon. An Old Testament explanation for the perversity of western geography might conclude that God did
this to test man's ability to use the gifts wisely. Certainly,
many of those who originally went West did so in the Old
Testament spirit of settling a promised land to exploit it.
From the middle of the nineteenth to the early twentieth
centuries, the West was settled as a society based on mining,
livestock grazing, and irrigated agriculture.1
Copyright ) 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

*A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965 Stanford University. Professor of Law, ChicagoKent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. This article is an
expanded version of the Frank J. Trelease lecture delivered at the University of Wyoming College of Law on October 22, 1982.
1. The origins of western settlement are traced in R.A. BILLINGTON, THE
FAR WESTERN FRONTIER: 1830-1860 (1956).
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One had to be hardy to survive outside of the more gentle
Pacific Coast region, and those who did took justifiable
pride in this accomplishment and naturally thought that
they had earned the exclusive right to chart the region's
future.' They therefore resented sharing control of their
resources with other parts of the country. But, however
justified this labor theory of exclusive sovereignty was, it
was made by colonists. The West was, until very recently,
a resource rich, capital poor region.' Eastern and foreign
capital was necessary to develop the resources, and the
western states were subject to a national government that
claimed not only superior political sovereignty but also, as
proprietor of the public domain, proprietary ownership of
much of the West's wealth.
Still, the West had reason to expect that it would gain
exclusive sovereignty over the key to its destiny, its natural
resources. The federal government failed to assert its claims
to the mineral and water wealth on the public domain until
much of that wealth had passed into private hands.4 Furthermore, for much of the nineteenth century it appeared
that the federal government would dispose of most of the
public domain to the states and to private parties.' However, the disposition era of the public domain ended before
the West was fully settled and disposed of so the federal
government ended up owning vast areas of public land or
severed mineral titles. This and the distance between Washington and the West have made the region feel threatened
by the national government and somewhat disdainful of its
expertise and direction.
Although the West never fully adjusted to the shifts
in public lands policy from disposition to simultaneous
2.
3.

See R. ATHEARN, HIGH COUNTRY EMPIRE 207 (1960).
The history of the west's transition from a colony to a major region of the
United States is described in G. NASH, THE AMERICAN WEST IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN URBAN OASIS (1973).

4. For example, coal lands were withdrawn in 1905 and 1906 after "[fit had
been discovered by the Geological Survey that large areas of valuable coal
lands in the West had been obtained from the government by means of
agricultural entries." B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES
518 (1924 U. Wis. ed. 1965).
5. GATES, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW (1968) is the standard history of
public domain policy.
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retention and disposition and ultimately to retention and
comprehensive management, as the latest Sagebrush Rebellion illustrates,' it has been able to live with less than full
resource sovereignty. There has been of course, and always
will be, conflict - at times substantial conflict 7 - between
federal and state resource policies, but an overall congruence of interest in areas such as grazing, mineral leasing,
timber production and reclamation has kept the friction
tolerable. The shock of shared control was further softened
because the states did effectively retain exclusive control
over the one resource, water, that determined the growth
of the region. The doctrine of prior appropriation, upon
which western water law is based, helped to contain sectional conflicts because it served both federal and state
interests well. Appropriation supported an irrigation and
livestock economy desired by both governments and gave
mineral and other industries adequate access to water."
Western adjustment to shared resource sovereignty
was made possible by a long period of gradual growth
after the initial rush of settlement. But, in the 1970's,
6. The Western states have always felt cheated that the disposition era
ended before they or private patentees obtained title to the public domain.
In recent years, the Western states, having failed to convince Congress to
cede either control or ownership of the bulk of the public lands to the
states, have asserted ownership of large amounts of the public lands under
various legal theories. Those theories conclude that the federal government
has a constitutional duty to divest itself of non-wilderness national forest
lands, and lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management under the
Taylor Grazing Act. The strongest constitutional argument asserted by the
states is that the equal footing doctrine, as interpreted in Pollard v. Hagen,
15 U.S. (3 How.) 391 (1844), imposes a duty on the federal government
to put new states on a resource par with the original 13 states (the federal
government has no retained lands in the original states). To date, this
argument has been properly rejected. Nevada State Bd. of Agriculture v.
United States, 512 F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981).
For an overview of the history of earlier divestiture movements, see
L. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951).

For a review of

current legal arguments, see Leshy, Unravelling the Sagebrush Rebellion:
Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 317 (1980); Mollison
and Eddy, Jr., The Sagebrush Rebellion: A Simplistic Response to the
Complex Problems of Federal Land Management, 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97

(1982); Note, The Property Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing
Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1980) and Note, The Sagebrush Rebellion:
Who Should Control the Public Lands? 1980 UTAH L. REV. 505.
7. For a review of the classic twentieth century public lands battles, see
L. PEFFER, supra note 6, and Regional Conflict and National Policy,
70 RESOURCES 1, July, 1982.

8. The vision of Wyoming's irrigation economy in 1940 is described in
WYOMING: A GUIDE TO ITS HISTORY, HIGHWAYS, AND PEOPLE 105-08 (1941).

See also Trelease, The Role of Water Law in Conserving and Developing
Natural Resources in the West, 18 Wyo. L.J. 3 (1963).
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the West began to come into its own as its population grew
rapidly. People were drawn to the region by the somewhat
incompatible lures of amenity and energy.
The energy boom in states such as Wyoming has
stressed both the states' resources9 and their institutions,
including the traditional assumption of the law of prior
appropriation that the locus of use is irrelevant to the right.
Most western states have reacted with both concern and
gratitude to the energy boom because it threatens to change
substantially or destroy the uniqueness of the region in
return for instant prosperity. Nowhere is this dual view
of energy development better reflected than in state policies
on the use of water for coal slurry pipelines. 10
Wyoming, along with other states, has singled out the
use of water for coal slurry pipelines for special regulation
and has placed severe restrictions on water use for interstate pipelines. These statutes may represent yet another
chapter in the endless friction between state and national
interests. As a matter of federal constitutional law, it is
said that export barriers may violate the negative commerce
clause, 1 and as a matter of legislative policy, it is said that
they may be inconsistent with the national goal of energy
independence. 2
In the 1981-82 Term, the Supreme Court held that
water was an article of interstate commerce, despite the
strenuous, longstanding arguments of the western states
that state ownership in trust for the public immunized
9. See Doherty, Wyoming Plays Its Hole Card, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 17,
1982, at 75.
10. See generally C. BORIS & J. KRUTILLA, WATER RIGHTS AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE YELLOWSTONE RIVER BASIN (1980); ACQUIRING WATER FOR
ENERGY: INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS (G. Weatherford ed. 1982).
11. Tarlock, Western Water Law and Coal Development, 51 U. CoLo. L. REV.
511, 538-41 (1980) ; Martz and Grazis, Interstate Transfers of Water and
Water Rights - The Slurry Issue, 23 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 33 (1977);
Corker, Can a State Embargo the Export of Water by Transbasin Diversion? 12 IDAHO L. REV. 135 (1976); Comment, Do State Water AntiExploration Statutes Violate the Commerce Clause, or Will New Mexico's
Embargo Statute Hold Water? 21 NAT. RESOURCES J. 617 (1981); ComCan Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the
ment, "It's Our Water" Exportation of State Waters? 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 119 (1975).
12. Clyde, State Prohibitions on Interstate Exportation of Scarce Water Resources, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 529, 531 (1982).
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state water law from negative commerce clause review.
In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 3 the Court found that a Nebraska
statute prohibiting the export of water from the state
violated the negative commerce clause.
Sporhase will be hailed by many as the death knell for
all state export ban statutes, including Wyoming's coal
slurry legislation, but this may be a premature conclusion.
This article attempts to develop, within the framework of
the Sporhase analysis, an approach to export statutes that
allows a state to assert its essential interests in determining
the locus of water use. This effort is animated by the normative argument that there is no basis for federal preemption
of state water law in this or any other energy issue. 4
A. The Coal Slurry Problem: Resource Sovereignty Aroused
After the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, the federal government announced a goal of energy independence. Under
Presidents Ford and Carter this goal was to be implemented,
in part, by increasing the use of abundant domestic resources. After a long period of neglect and shrinking mar5
kets, coal was again nominated for energy stardom.'
One goal of the new coal policy was to transport coal
as cheaply as possible from areas of supply to areas of
demand. Pipeline companies argued that this could be done,
by changing lump coal into slurry and piping the mixture
to areas of high demand, such as the Southeast.' Railroads,
afraid of losing a near monopoly on western coal transportation, objected strenuously to such proposals. Western
ranchers and environmentalists objected as well, fearing
13

-

---.--.
U.S.

,

102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).

14. See Tarlock and Fairfax, FederalProprietary [Water) Rights for Western
Energy Development: An Analysis of Red Herring? 3 J. ENERGY L. &
POL'Y 1 (1982).
15. See Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 315 (1982)
(This article provides a brief history of the role of coal in Post-World
War 11 energy planning).
16. For an early summary of the pipeline companies' arguments, see Haerle,
Legal and PracticalAspects of Coal Slurry Construction and Use, in COAL
CONVERSION: PRACTICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 217 (P.L.I. 1977).
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the impact on water resources.1 7 Estimates vary, but the
amounts involved are substantial.
The issue took on an added edge, which has now blurred,
during the mid-1970's when the West was awash with
energy and water studies that forecast the drying up of
western streams to develop conventional and unconventional
energy sources and to generate electricity to keep pace with
demand. Western states responded to these vague fears of
water depletion with a variety of export ban statutes, many
of which singled out coal slurry pipelines either directly or
indirectly. The issue became complicated when the pipelines
turned to Congress for national legislation giving them the
power of eminent domain in order to circumvent the railroads' refusal to grant rights of way under their tracks.
The water issue quickly became enmeshed in the pipeline
legislation, which has yet to pass Congress.""
B. Water Export Bans: Resource Sovereignty Asserted
Western states have enacted a variety of laws to limit
the diversion of water for out-of-state uses. A few states
have flat export prohibitions. New Mexico flatly prohibits
the withdrawal of all groundwater for out-of-state uses.1 '
Montana prohibits the export of*all waters and, to be doubly
safe, provides that the use of water for coal slurry is nonbeneficial." Similar legislation exists in Oklahoma. ProOF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE DIRECT USE OF COAL 237
(1979); Boris & Krutilla, supra note 10, at 123-25.
18. See Comment, Do State Restrictions on Water Use by Slurry Pipelines
Violate the Commerce Clause? 53 U. COLO. L. REv. 655 (1982).
19. The prohibition extends to drilling a well on New Mexico territory and
transporting the water out of state or by drilling on the territory of a
neighboring state and extracting the water from beneath land lying within
New Mexico's boundaries. However, the statute expressly allows the outof-state transportation by tank truck of water withdrawn from an underground source if the water will be used out of state for exploration and
drilling for oil and gas. The maximum allowable amount of water withdrawn from any one well for exploration may not exceed three acrefeet. The statute also prescribes certain duties owed by the owner.; of a
well from which water for export is withdrawn. He must ascertain'that
the water is exported only for use in oil and gas drilling. He must also
keep records of the amount of water withdrawn for export. These records
are subject to state inspection. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978).
20. An act of the legislature would be required in Montana to circumvent the
flat prohibition laid down by the statute: "None of the waters in the state
of Montana shall ever be appropriated, diverted, impounded or otherwise
restrained or controlled while within the state for use outside the boundaries thereof, . . ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981). MONT. CODE ANN.
17.

See OFFICE
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hibitions in other states are facially less absolute but have
the effect of barring out-of-state uses. Nebraska,22 Nevada"
and Washington 24 limit out-of-state diversions to states that
allow a reciprocal right of interstate use. Colorado also has
a reciprocity statute, but in addition to demonstrating
host-state reciprocity, the diverter must obtain legislative
approval for an out-of-state use.25
Concern over the use of water has led other states to
the requirement of legislative approval for any out-of-state
uses. Wyoming has required that slurry coal pipelines receive legislative approval."8 South Dakota requires legisla§ 85-2-104(1) and (2) (1981) provides that using water "for the slurry
transport of coal is detrimental to the conservation and protection of the
water resources of the state" and that such use "is not a beneficial use
of water." For a useful discussion of the legislative history of the Montana
legislation, see Comment, Coal Slurry: All Quiet On the Western Front? 3
THE PuS. LAND L. REV. 156 (1982).
21. "No Oklahoma water from any source shall be used in connection with the
transportation, maintenance or operation of a coal slurry pipeline within
or through the State of Oklahoma." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 7.6 (West
Supp. 1977).
22. Nebraska requires that anyone intending to divert water for an out-ofstate use must file a permit application with the Department of Water
Resources. The permit will be granted if the Director finds that the request "is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46.613.01 (Reissue 1978). This statute was held unconstitutional
, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
U.S.
in Sporhase v. Nebraska,
23.

NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.515 (1979).

24. The Washington statute differs from those of Nebraska and Nevada in
that the granting of permits for diversion of Washington water to another
state is discretionary with the Supervisor of Water Resources, unless the
other state has enacted a reciprocity statute. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 90.03.300 (1962). On the statute's face the Supervisor may allow appropriation of water to a state that does not have a reciprocity statute. However, the last section of the Water Rights Act specifies that the provisions
of the Water Rights Act shall not apply to any state which does not grant
reciprocal

rights to the state of Washington.

§ 90.16.120 (1962).

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1981). Colorado prohibits, in most
instances, diversion of its waters outside its boundaries. However, the use of
Colorado water outside the state is allowed only where an owner of agricultural land within Colorado also owns agricultural land in another state,
and the Colorado water is to be used only for agricultural purposes. The
statute requires that the land in Colorado be contiguous with the land in
the adjacent state. In addition, legislative approval (on the advice of the
state engineer) is required for such use. A factor in the legislature's
decision will be the "willingness of said state to allow diversions of its
water for use in Colorado." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1982).
26. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977). The Wyoming statute allows an interstate
appropriation of water only to states that have granted reciprocal rights.
WYO. STAT. § 41-3-115(c) (1977). In addition, the use of Wyoming water
as a means of transportation of mineral or chemical products outside the
state without prior legislative approval is prohibited. Wyo. STAT. § 41-3115(b) (1977). These provisions do not extend to the use of Wyoming
water in coal slurry pipelines. Generally, however, any use of water outside
the state must be with the prior consent of the legislature. WYO. STAT.
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tive approval for all diversions over ten thousand acre-feet
annually, except "for the approval of water permits for
energy industry use.""7 The export of water for coal slurry
pipelines is controlled by other statutes that are not designed
to conserve water for in-state use, but to allow the state to
enter the water market directly. Oregon requires that all
interstate diversions obtain legislative consent. 8
In general, there is very little positive to be said for
water export barriers. Such statutes frustrate the efficient
allocation of water resources because they prevent the market from operating to shift uses to the areas of the highest
demand. Economic efficiency is, by general consensus, the
major goal of water resources allocation. Of course, the
state has plenary power to choose goals other than efficiency." Ideally, however, when allocative efficiency is subordinated to equity, one ought to be able to identify with some
precision the alternative goals sought to be advanced by the
legislation. Judged by this standard, the statutes by and
large fail.
It is easy to imagine state interests that might be
served by export barriers. However, the statutes, like so
much of mega-water law and water politics, are poses. They
reflect a variety of fears about what might happen if
§ 41-3-105 (1977). Wyoming has special provisions which legislatively
approve the Energy Transportation Systems' (ETSI) coal slurry pipeline
-proposal. The statute provides a two-tiered screening procedure for this coal
slurry pipeline use application. The application must first be approved by
the state engineer and then by the legislature. Furthermore, diversions are
limited to twenty thousand acre-feet annually. WYo. STAT. § 41-3-115(d)
(1977). The Wyoming legislature grandfathered ETSI's pipeline application statute subject to stringent conditions to protect vested rights. Wyo.
STAT. § 41-3-115(g) (Supp. 1982).
27. Under the South Dakota statute, the Water Management Board must
present any application for appropriation of over ten thousand acre-feet
of water to the legislature for approval. However, even if the legislature
approves the application, the Water Management Board has the final word.
The statute states expressly that legislative approval does not constitute
an issuance of a water permit. S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 46.5.20.1 (Supp.
1982). See infra note 105 for a further discussion of South Dakota's water
allocation scheme.
28. Oregon law requires legislative approval of an out-of-state diversion of
Oregon water. The statute gives the legislature the discretion to attach
to an application any "terms, conditions, exception, reservations, restrictions and provisions as it may care to make in the protection of the interests of the state and its inhabitants." OR.REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1981).
29. See Trelease, Policies for Water Law: Property Rights, Economic Forces,
and Public Regulation, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1965).
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"outsiders" gained access to "our" water."s There is little
evidence that they are necessary to conserve essential supplies on which the state's population depends. Nor is there
much evidence that the statutes represent a reservation of
future supplies to prevent future shortages and to allow
various intrastate development plans to be realized. These
statutes bear only a superficial resemblance to more careful
area protection schemes such as California's area of origin
recent effort to condition transstatutes"' or Nebraska's
82
basin diversions.
C. Limits on Exclusive State Control Over Water: The Duty
to Share
By law, tradition, and history, western states possess a
strong expectation that they may control the allocation of
waters arising within their borders. But, however strong
the expectation of exclusive control, state claims are subject
to two interstate, and one inter-sovereign, sharing duties.
Common property claimants have equal claims; thus, the
law has always recognized that common resources such as
interstate streams must be shared among riparian states.
The Supreme Court's power to decree equitable apportionments means that "higherority" can never be a perfect
priority.3 States are quasi-sovereign units of a federal
system, and the national government can require that state
interests be subordinated to federal interests. This subordination is accomplished under the authority of the commerce and supremacy clauses. Congress has plenary power
to allocate navigable waters among states under the commerce and other clauses, and courts may use the negative
commerce clause to do this. In addition to the two extraterritorial sharing duties, western states must share some,
30. Clyde, supra note 12, at 530-31.
31. Robie and Kletzing, Area of Origin Statutes - The CaliforniaExperience,
15 IDAHO L. REV. 419 (1979).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-265 was amended in 1981, 1981 NEB. LAWs 252, in
response to Little Blue N. Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte Natural
Resources Dist., 206 Neb. 535, 294 N.W.2d 598 (1980), which overruled a
prior Nebraska case prohibiting transbasin diversions. See also Little Blue
N. Natural Resources Dist. v. Lower Platte Natural Resources Dist., 201
Neb. 862, 317 N.W.2d 726 (1982).
33. See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
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although not a great deal, of their waters with the federal
government. The federal government's proprietary ownership of the public lands entitles Congress to claim reserved
water rights when public lands (and Indian reservations)
34
are dedicated to a water-related use.
The commerce clause is both a grant of legislative
power to Congress and a judicially administered restraint
on state legislation alleged to be inconsistent with federal
interests. At one time, the scope of Congress' power over
waters not navigable under historic tests was unclear. This
is no longer the case, but the use of the negative commerce
clause continues to be controversial. The negative commerce
clause is important to the West because it threatens to
nullify state efforts to block the diversion of intrastate
waters for out-of-state uses. A long line of Supreme Court
cases has progressively undermined state claims to exclusive
rights to allocate their waters free from negative commerce
clause review. In the 1981-82 Term, the Court decided
Sporhase v. Nebraska,which held that a state law prohibiting
the transportation of water diverted in Nebraska out of state
unless the host state permitted reciprocal interstate diversions, violated the negative commerce clause.
Chief Justice Marshall first announced the negative
commerce clause doctrine in Gibbons v. Ogden in 1824," 5
but the legitimacy of the use of the doctrine is questioned
as much today as it was by early critics. The doctrine lacks
textual support in the Constitution, and the results of recent
Supreme Court opinions suggest that the Court is ill-suited
to play the grand role of regional conflict adjuster.
Both Marshall and subsequent promoters of the doctrine
have sought to validate the doctrine by the theory that. the
34. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976). As a result of United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), the federal government must
meet a strict three-part test. The right must relate to the original purpose
of the reservation, the right must be necessary to prevent the frustration
of the primary purpose of the reservation and the right must be for a
primary, not secondary, purpose of the reservation. For a discussion of the
federal reserved rights doctrine, and a summary of the voluminous literature that has developed around it, see Tarlock and Fairfax, supra note 14.
35. 6 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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benefits of federal union are constantly being undermined
by parochial state legislation. Building on Mr. Justice
Jackson's opinion in H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,36
Professor Ernest Brown articulated the current justification
for the active use of the doctrine to scrutinize state legislation said to have an adverse impact on interstate commerce:
it is appropriate for the Court to reinforce the nationalist
vision of free trade among the states in situations where
state legislatures have enacted anti-competitive statutes that
are unlikely to be the subject of Congressional review and
revision."3

Given a federal system that allows states considerable
discretion to adopt regulatory schemes, especially those that
further traditional spheres of state interest, but that must
of necessity effect interstate commerce, it is not easy to
articulate what should be the Supreme Court's role in deciding if a piece of legislation or a regulation violates the
negative commerce clause. At the heart of the matter is the
lack of standards for sharing among states. There is no
core concept, like access to forums to express ideas, on
which the Court can fall back." "Free trade" is too simplistic to describe the current course of state and federal
economic policies. Any attempt to reduce to a doctrinal
formula what level of sharing is essential to the preservation
of the federal union is bound to be arbitrary. Why is it that
a state must share access to waste management sites but
not to state-manufactured cement?39
The Court has attempted to define its role in deciding
whether state regulation is inconsistent with national interests in interstate commerce by a two-level analysis. First,
statutes that facially discriminate against interstate com36. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
37. Brown, The Open Economy: Justice Frankfurter and the Position of the
Judiciary, 67 YALE L.J. 219 (1957). For a recent articulation of this justification, see J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL

PROCESS 205-09 (1980).
38. Justice Frankfurter made an unsuccessful attempt to enunciate such a
standard in his concurring opinion in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 409
(1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
39. Compare City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) with

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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merce or citizens of another state are almost per se invalid. °
The standard applied is strict scrutiny. Second, nonfacially discriminatory legislation is subject to a balancing
test that requires the strength of the local interest to be identified and weighed against national interests.
Since Pike v. Bruce Church,41 the Court has adhered
to this analysis, which is a refinement of Justice Stone's
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 4' balancing test. According
to Pike:
Although the criteria for determining the
validity of state statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule
that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the
statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S.
440, 443. If a legitimate local purpose is found,
then the question becomes one of degree. And the
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."'
The test has the merits of candor and conciseness,
but it is open to the criticism that the factors balanced give
insufficient weight to legitimate state interests. For example, the Court had long held that a state had the power
to impede interstate commerce through the imposition of
quarantine or other public health laws, but in City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey"' the Court applied the negative
commerce clause doctrine to require New Jersey to take its
fair share of wastes generated out of state.
40. Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause, and
State Control of NaturalResources, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 51, 59.
41. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
42. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
43. 397 U.S. at 142.
44. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Accord Washington State Bldg. and Constr. Trades
Council v. Spellman, 18 ERC 1073 (9th Cir. 1982).
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City of Philadelphia is especially troubling because it
uses the negative commerce clause to invalidate state legislation where the state interests are quite strong and the
problem is part of a larger problem that is being addressed
at the national level. Congress has passed extensive legislation to regulate the transportation and treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous and other wastes. But Congress
and the Environmental Protection Agency have chosen to
leave waste disposal-siting issues to the states. Thus, it is
not clear that the Supreme Court's insistence that all states
take their fair share of wastes correctly reflects national
policy.45 Moreover, whether the Constitution compels the
acceptance" of interstate wastes or other evils is even more
doubtful.
A more sensible rule, sanctioned by Justice Holmes'
opinion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper,7 is a presumption
of a state right of self-help until preempted by Congress.
The Court has had a difficult time applying the proper standards to test state legislative motivation and state interest
in routine interferences with interstate commerce. Consequently, there is very little basis for optimism that Supreme
Court decisions invalidating state legislation in areas such
as slurry bans and environmental protection statutes will
articulate basic national policies in a fashion superior to
that of the legislative process."
D. The Rise and Fall of the Special Status of Natural Resources Under the Commerce Clause: Ownership of
Western Waters
To shore up their claims to resource sovereignty, the
western states have long argued that they alone could con45. See Tarlock, Anywhere But Here: An Introduction to State Control of
Hazardous Waste Facility Location, 2 U.C.L.A. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1
(1982).
46. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 628-29 (1978). Justice
Stewart did say, in dictum, that "it may be assumed .

.

. that New Jersey

may pursue those ends [pollution prevention] by slowing the flow of all
waste into the state's remaining land fills, even though interstate commerce
may incidentally be effected." Id. at 626.
47. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
48. An analogous issue in the energy area is state mineral severance taxes.
The Court recently upheld Montana's 30% tax against a commerce clause
challenge in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 450 U.S. 991 (1981),
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trol the allocation of their waters because they "owned them
in trust for the public." This argument is nothing more
than an assertion of the police power, but for years the
western states argued that this ownership made water
unique in the sense that it was immune from regulation
under the federal Constitution. Long after the issue of
affirmative federal power was settled, the uniqueness argument lived on in the negative commerce clause. Until
Sporhase, the states clung to the slim, unreasonable hope
that the Court would adhere to early precedents and affirm
the uniqueness of water. The reason was that the Supreme
Court began its application of the negative commerce clause
to resource embargo statutes with a sweeping theory upholding them.
In the foundation case Geer v. Connecticut,41 the Court
rejected a commerce clause challenge to a statute that prohibited the interstate transportation of game birds lawfully
killed within the state. Geer capped a remarkable development of the Roman law conceptions of things ferae naturae
and res nullius, things in the negative community awaiting
capture. The Roman notion that everything had to be
assigned to someone was a perfect justification for the use
of the principle of capture to recognize private rights in
common pool resources such as oil and gas and water. Roman
law was also elastic enough to serve as a basis for state
conservation legislation at a time when the claim that the
state had the power to decide, by virtue of its police power,
who would capture what and under what conditions was
constitutionally suspect. In Roscoe Pound's famous words:
We are also tending to limit the idea of discovery
and occupation by making res nullius (e.g., wild
game) into res publicae and to justify a more
stringent regulation of individual use of res communes (e.g., of the use of running water for irriand Professor Stephen Williams has developed a rationale similar to that
stated in the text here for the Court's decision. Williams. Severance Taxes
and Federalism:The Role of the Supreme Court in Preserving a National
Common Market for Energy Supplies, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 281, 309-13

(1982).
49. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
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gation or for power) by declaring that they are the
property of the state or are "owned by the state in
trust for the people." It should be said, however,
that while in form our courts and legislatures
seem thus to have reduced everything but the air
and the high seas to ownership, in fact the so-called
state ownership of res communes and res nullius
is only a sort of guardianship for social purposes.
It is imperium, not dominium °
Geer went beyond this use of Roman law. Not only did the
Supreme Court accept without question the argument that
the statute was an appropriate food conservation statute,
but it suggested that resources owned in trust by the state
could never become part of interstate commerce "except with
the consent of the state and subject to the conditions which
it may deem best to impose for the public good."51
Geer was directly applied to water export bans in
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.2 Justice Holmes
was too good a jurist to use the state title fiction; instead,
he sustained the New Jersey statute banning the export of
water on the broader theory of state sovereignty over
resources:
It sometimes is difficult to fix boundary stones
between the private right of property and the
police power when, as in the case at bar, we know
of few decisions that are very much in point. But
it is recognized that the State as quasi-sovereign
and representative of the interests of the public
has a standing in court to protect the atmosphere,
the water and forests within its territory, irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners
of the land most immediately concerned. What it
may protect by suit in this court from interference
in the name of property outside of the State's jurisdiction, one would think that it could protect by
statute from interference in the same name within.
50. R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 111 (1954
Yale U. Press ed.). The state ownership theory as justification for exclusive state power to allocate its water is generally traced to Farm Inv. Co.
v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
51. 161 U.S. at 535.
52. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). See also McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
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The problems of irrigation have no place here.
Leaving them on one side, it appears to us that
few public interests are more obvious, indisputable
and independent of particular theory than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers
that are wholly within it substantially undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the
guardian of the public welfare may permit for the
purpose of turning them to a more perfect use. This
public interest is omnipresent wherever there is
a State, and grows more pressing as population
grows. It is fundamental, and we are of opinion that
the private property of riparian proprietors cannot
be supposed to have deeper roots."
Geer was flawed from the start because the theory of
state ownership swept too broadly. Given the reach of the
negative commerce clause, no state assertion of regulatory
power can be immune from judicial scrutiny to determine its
effect on interstate commerce and the risk to the continued
validity of the federal union. Geer was substantially undermined in Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Company" and
in subsequent opinions, but it survived formally until 1979.
Oklahoma v. Kansas National Gas Company arose because Oklahoma passed a statute forbidding the interstate
transportation of natural gas. The state defended its legislation on the strongest of necessity grounds: Oklahoma was
the fastest growing state in the country; it was without
domestic fuel except coal, which was becomnig more costly
to produce; it was dependent on natural gas because almost
all of its oil was transported out of state; and as a result,
certain cities next to gas fields "should be supplied with gas,
are not now supplied with it, and will never be if complainants are allowed to transport it from Oklahoma." 5 Over the
dissents of Justices Holmes, Lurton and Hughes, the Court
held that the statute violated the commerce clause.
Geer was not directly discussed; instead the Court
began its analysis with the seminal oil and gas conservation
53. Hudson County Water Co. v McCarter, 209 US. at 355-56 (1908) (citations
omitted). Accord Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
54. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
55. Id. at 246.
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case, Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana." Ohio Oil sustained the first
state effort to conserve natural gas supplies by banning well
flaring. Indiana had tried to circumvent Ohio Oil's claim that
the ban interfered impermissibly with the company's right to
dispose of its gas as it chose by arguing that oil and gas
were ferae naturae and thus never owned by the company
prior to reduction to possession. Justice White rejected this
argument on the ground that oil and gas were not truly
analogous to things ferae naturae because the right to capture had been assigned to a limited class of property owners
those who owned land overlying a common source of
supply. The statute was sustained, however, on the narrow,
but innovative theory that it was an exercise of the state's
power to protect the correlative rights of those property
owners, which included a fair opportunity to capture a
reasonable share of the supply.
In Oklahoma the Court concluded that the embargo was
bad precisely because it did not protect the correlative rights
of property owners but rather reserved resources for the
future use of state residents. Gas, the Court stated, when
reduced to possession, was clearly an article of interstate
commerce. The purpose of the statute, the Court found, was
commercial rather than physical conservation; therefore
the statute violated the commerce clause because it undermined the concept of a federal system bound together by
free trade:
In other words, the purpose of its conservation is
in a sense commercial - the business welfare of
the State, as coal might be, or timber. Both of those
products may be limited in amount, and the same
consideration of the public welfare which would
confine gas to the use of the inhabitants of a State
would confine them to the inhabitants of the State.
If the States have such power a singular situation
might result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the
Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals. And why may not the products of the field
be brought within the principle? Thus enlarged, or
56. 177 U.S. 190( 1900).
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without that enlargement, its influence on interstate commerce need not be pointed out. To what
consequences does such power tend? If one State
has it, all States have it; embargo may be retaliated
by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state
lines 5 7
McCarter was discussed and distinguished on several
weak grounds. The strongest was that the common law of
riparian rights did not allow diversion to non-riparian land.
Today this view prevails in its strict form in very few states.
Furthermore, the Court has recognized the power of states
to enter into interstate compacts which might limit private
water rights. The suggestion in McCarter, repeated in
Oklahoma, that the export ban did little more than preserve
private correlative rights is therefore too broad, because the
private rights protected may be substantially modified pursuant to an interstate compact or decree of equitable apportionment. Justice Holmes perhaps anticipated this weakness
and ultimately rested his opinion in the case on the state's
power to preserve its natural advantage." The Oklahoma
Court could only deal with Holmes' analysis by arbitrarily
concluding that natural gas was a less important resource
than a flowing river: "And surely we need not pause to
point out the difference between such a river flowing upon
the surface of the earth and such a substance as gas seeping
invisibly through sands beneath the surface."" It is hard to
see why.
Since Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Company, the
Court has adhered to its vision of the resource embargo
causing a complete breakdown of interstate commerce in its
57. 221 U.S. at 255.
58. Justice Holmes applied his views of state sovereignty in the foundation case
recognizing a common law of nuisance. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907). It is ironic that Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in
Sporhase along the lines of Justice Holmes' theory of state power, wrote
the opinion in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Milwaukee reversed Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972), which had held
that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act did not preempt the federal
common law of nuisance. Milwaukee held that the Clean Water Act, enacted a year after Illinois was decided, did preempt the common law of
nuisance. This is bad law and bad policy, but relief will have to come from
Congress.

59. 221 U.S. at 260.
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analysis of export bans. For example, in 1982, the Court in
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire" unanimously
invalidated an order of the New Hampshire Public Service
Commission revoking previously granted permission for a
utility to transport hydroelectric energy generated within
the state to traditional areas of high demand in New England.
Chief Justice Burger contemptuously wrote off the statute
as "simple economic protectionism." 1
Despite the flawed analysis of state power in Geer,
western states clung tenaciously to the ownership fiction
for two reasons. First, the states asserted ownership as a
basis for denying federal proprietary rights, although this
effort failed. The Supreme Court is committed to the doctrine
of federal reserved water rights, and few doubt the constitutional basis of the federal government's power."2 Second,
since the mid-1960's there have been plans afoot for massive
inter-basin water transfers. In most cases the political and
economic costs of these projects carry their own death
wound in the form of an unfavorable benefit-cost analysis,
but more modest inter-basin diversions, such as coal slurry
pipelines, may be cost-justified. To prevent all inter-basin
transfers, the states have urged the Geer rule and its application in McCarter. This argument was doomed to failure
as it is nothing more than an ineffective assertion of the
state's police power;"3 the only remarkable thing is that
Geer formally lasted until 1979 and McCarter lingered until
1982.
Geer finally fell in Hughes v. Oklahoma." At issue was
the epic question of whether Oklahoma could prohibit the
60.

The more interesting issue was
, 102 S.Ct. 1096 (1982).
U.S.
whether Congress had authorized export bans in section 201(b) of the
Federal Power Act. It seems clear that this section was drafted to preserve
New Hampshire's right under the 1913 statute. The Court agreed that
Congress could authorize barriers to interstate commerce but found that
Congress merely left standing existing laws banning the export of hydroelectricity and did not intend to suspend the negative commerce clause.

See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 102 S.Ct. at 1101 (1982)
(quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624 (1978)).
62. See Trelease, Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to
People, States and Nation, 1963 Sup. CT. REV. 158.
63. The argument was laid to rest in Dean Trelease's classic article, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 638 (1957).
64. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

61.
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transport of natural minnows "seigned or procured within
the waters of the state." 5 Writing for a seven member majority, Justice Brennan traced the demise of Geer's formalistic"0 ownership analysis and concluded "that challenges
under the Commerce Clause to state regulations of wild animals should be considered according to the same general rule
applied to state regulations of other natural resources. . ." ;67
he then expressly overruled Geer.
Applying the Court's reasoning in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.,"s Justice Brennan subjected the statute to the "strictest
scrutiny" because it was facially discriminatory, and found
it invalid. The state put forward a modern conservation
argument to the effect that it wanted to preserve the ecological balance of its waters by preventing the removal of
an inordinate number of natural minnows, but this justification was found to be an insufficient, although legitimate,
state interest. The Court stated that the fiction of state
ownership could no longer be used to force those outside the
state to bear the full costs of " 'conserving' the wild animals
within its borders when equally effective nondiscriminatory
conservation measures are available":"9
Far from choosing the least discriminatory
alternative, Oklahoma has chosen to "conserve" its
minnows in the way that most overtly discriminates
against interstate commerce. The State places no
limits on the numbers of minnows that can be taken
65. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (Supp. 1978).
66. 411 U.S. at 328. Geer was in effect overruled in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948). The Court used both the privileges and immunities and commerce clauses to strike down legislation that discriminated against out-ofstate fishermen. With respect to the commerce clause, the Court wrote:
The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource. And there is
no necessary conflict between that vital policy consideration and
the constitutional command that the State exercise that power,
like its other powers, so as not to discriminate without reason
against citizens of other States.
Id. at 402.
Toomer was recently followed and applied in Douglas v. Seacoast Products,
Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
67. 441 U.S. at 335.
68. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
69. 441 U.S. at 337.
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by licensed minnow dealers; nor does it limit in any
way how these minnows may be disposed of within
the State. Yet it forbids the transportation of any
commercially significant number of natural minnows out of the State for sale. Section 4-115 (B) is
certainly not a "last ditch" attempt at conservation
after nondiscriminatory alternatives have proved
unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory means even though nondiscriminatory
alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's
purported legitimate local purpose more effectively. 0
The state of Oklahoma attracted only the votes of Chief
Justice Burger and the new guardian of Western state
interests, Mr. Justice Rehnquist. The dissent accepted the
majority's analysis up to the point where it downgraded
the state's conservation interest. To Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
the fear-of-Balkanization argument relied on by Justice
Brennan supported only the invalidation of statutes that conflict with a federal statute or treaty or represent "a naked
attempt to discriminate against out-of-state enterprises in
favor of in-state businesses unrelated to any purpose of conservation."7 1 He distinguished Oklahoma's statute from the
long line of cases striking down statutes, palmed off as conservation measures, that protected in-state businesses from
out-of-state competition. Given what he saw as the statute's
evenhandedness, he found the burden on interstate commerce
to be minimal and the state's conservation interest substantial:
Oklahoma does regulate the manner in which
both residents and nonresidents procure minnows
to be sold outside the State. But there is no showing
in this record that requiring appellant to purchase
his minnows from hatcheries instead of from persons licensed to seine minnows from the State's
waters in any way increases appellant's costs of
doing business .... So far as the record before us
indicates, hatchery minnows and naturally seined
70. Id. at 337-38 (citations and footnotes omitted).
71. Id. at 342 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385 (1948) ; Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Johnson v.
Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928).
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minnows are fungible. Accordingly, any minimal
burden that may result from requiring appellant
to purchase minnows destined for sale out of state
from hatcheries instead of from those licensed to
seine minnows is, in my view, more than outweighed by Oklahoma's substantial interest in conserving and regulating exploitation of its natural
minnow population. 2
Negative commerce clause decisions reflect a high
level of doctrinal consistency and predictability. However,
they are increasingly being criticized. The Pike test emerges
upon closer examination as just another version of the largely
discredited theory of substantive due process.7" It is not surprising that those uncomfortable with the difficulty of distinguishing the discredited notion of substantive due process
from the Court's commerce clause analysis have turned to
alternative approaches to justify the Court's role in this
aspect of federalism.
To some, a revived theory of privileges and immunities
is the answer."4 Others have been influenced by Dean John
Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust and have sought a
process-based approach that seeks the important but more
limited goal of curing serious malfunctions in the representative process. An approach based on this theory replaces
the Court's balancing test with a four part test; to determine
whether a statute offends the negative commerce clause, a
court should inquire whether (1) the end is legitimate,
(2) the statute has a disproportionate impact on nonrepresented interests, (3) the legislation is likely to achieve its
goal, and (4) the legislature has chosen the least restrictive
means of implementing its goal in light of the heavy impact
on nonrepresented entities."
The Ely-influenced test holds the promise of possible
constitutionality for some embargoes, because it relaxes
72. 441 U.S. at 345-46.
73. See Kitch, Regulation and the American Common Market, in REGULATION,
FEDERALISM AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 29-36 (A. Tarlock ed. 1981).
74. See Varat, State "Citizenship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487 (1981). See also Anson and Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Cormerce Clause, and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEXAS L. REV. 71 (1980).
75. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425
(1982).
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rules that result in findings of per se invalidity and it
validates state laws that do not foreclose access to the
political process: "The representation-enforcing approach
commands judicial intervention where the mechanisms of
participatory government have failed to operate, but it also
requires deference where no such defect appears."" It also
offers a way out of the motives trap into which the Court
has fallen under the present test."' In the final section of
this paper, the implications of this approach for western
water embargoes are explored.
E. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex. rel Douglas:" Is Western
Water No Longer Unique?
In 1982 the second precedential pillar of the western
states' "ownership" argument fell. Sporhase v. Nebraska"
effectively overruled McCarter and held that a Nebraska
groundwater export ban violated the negative commerce
clause. On one level Sporhase is simply another in the growing line of Supreme Court cases clearing away nineteenth
century fictions thought to be inconsistent with free trade.
However, Justice Stevens' opinion demonstrates more sensitivity to the arid states' interests in water policy than one
might expect after Hughes and other recent natural resources
commerce clause cases and suggests that some export bans
might be constitutional. Further, the opinion suggests, at
a minimum, other means by which the western states can
constitutionally achieve the objectives reflected in such
statutes.
The facts of Sporhase made the case a relatively easy
one and therefore do not necessarily foreclose a different
result where the state's interest is stronger. Nebraska required a permit for the interstate diversion of groundwater.
The Director of the Department of Natural Resources had
76. Id. at 442. For a democratic defense of the Court's current role, see Gibson,
ConstitutionalAdjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 260,
265 (1981).
77. Compare Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.U.S -......
, 101
S.Ct. 1309 (1981) with Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429
(1978). See The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 93-102
(1981).
78.-....... U.S -...--- 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
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to find that the withdrawal was "reasonable" and "not
otherwise detrimental to the public welfare" and that the
host state "grant[ed] reciprocal rights to withdraw and
transport groundwater from that state for use in the State
of Nebraska." 9 A farmer on the Colorado border who owned
contiguous tracts of land in both states acted as would any
single rational landowner and shifted water from a Nebraska
well to the Colorado portion of his land when that land required water. But, he failed to apply for the permit required
by Nebraska law, and the state sued to enjoin the interstate
transfer.
Both the trial court and the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the statute did not impose an undue burden on
interstate commerce.8" The supreme court based its decision
on the conclusion that a groundwater right was not "a
marketable item freely transferable for value among private
parties, and therefore [is] not an article of commerce."81
This allowed the court to distinguish the enigmatic case of
City of Altus v. Carr. 2 The court in City of Altus followed
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. to strike down Texas
legislation, which was similar to Nebraska's, as an undue
burden on interstate commerce. The United States Supreme
Court affirmed summarily, and there has been considerable
speculation ever since over the reach of the decision. 8
To the Nebraska Supreme Court, the crucial issue was
the difference between a Texas and a Nebraska groundwater right. Texas, until recently, followed the classic English rule that allowed unlimited, even wasteful,84 pumping of
groundwater for use on overlying or non-overlying land
provided that the purpose was not malicious. Nebraska is
an appropriation state for surface water but not for ground79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978).
208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981).
Id., 305 N.W.2d at 616.
255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
See, eg., Corker, supra note 11.
City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798
(1955). In Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21
(Tex. 1978), the Texas Supreme Court prospectively modified its adherence
to the English rule that allows a landowner injured by subsidence to show
that the pumper's use pattern negligently caused the injury.
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water. A Nebraska groundwater right, like a Texas one, is
based on overlying land ownership, but the state legislature
and courts have placed significant restrictions on its use
compared to those imposed in Texas. Groundwater users in
Nebraska have some right to a fair share of a pool,8" and
the state has natural resources districts and management
districts that limit pumping levels in areas of actual or
potential overdraft." This distinction, however, even if correct cannot be an answer to a commerce clause challenge,
if for no other reason than that the statute prohibits interstate transportation of water after it has been extracted
from the ground and has thus become the personal property
of the diverter.
Hughes v. Oklahoma removed the conceptual underpinnings from the state's ownership argument by overruling
Geer. Justice Stevens dealt the coup de grace to state ownership arguments in Sporhase by holding that Hughes overruled McCarter by implication, and by brushing aside the
proffered distinction between water and minnows:
Although appellee's greater ownership interest may
not be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis, it
does not absolutely remove Nebraska ground water
from such scrutiny. For appellee's argument is still
based on the legal fiction of state ownership. The
fiction is illustrated by municipal water supply
arrangements pursuant to which ground water is
withdrawn from rural areas and transferred to
urban areas. Such arrangements are permitted in
Nebraska, but the Nebraska Supreme Court distinguished them on the ground that the transferor was
only permitted to charge as a price for the water
his costs of distribution and not the value of the
water itself. Unless demand is greater than supply,
however, this reasoning does not distinguish minnows, the price of which presumably is derived from
the costs of seining and of transporting the catch
to market. Even in cases of shortage, in which the
seller of the natural resource can demand a price
85. Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766 (1978).
86. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 NEB. L.
REV. 917 (1980).
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that exceeds his costs, the State's rate structure
that requires the price to be cost-justified is economically comparable to price regulation. A State's
power to regulate prices or rates has never been
thought to depend 8on
public ownership of the con7
trolled commodity.
There is little that should surprise western water
lawyers in the Court's conclusion that water rights are
an article of commerce because of the interstate effects of
state water allocation choices. This is perfectly illustrated
by the fact that Sporhase involved the Ogallala aquifer.
Western water rights are no different from Arizona cantaloupes 8 or North Carolina apples.8 9 The existence of federal
power over waters was conclusively established in Arizona
v. California.' As Justice Stevens recognized in Sporhase, a
contrary conclusion "would curtail the affirmative power of
Congress to implement its own policies." 1
To say that water is an article of interstate commerce
is not to conclude that a state export statute impermissibly
burdens interstate commerce. The Court, in Sporhase, did
find such a burden, but the majority's application of the
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.2 test leaves western states with
some room to maneuver. Nebraska's statute failed to pass
muster because the stand-off between the two state reciprocity statutes operated "as an explicit barrier to [interstate] commerce" and the statute failed to demonstrate "a
close fit between the reciprocity requirement and its asserted
local purpose.""3 Nebraska's sole justification for the statute - conservation - was bound to be overbroad because
the state straddles the line between humidity and aridity.
States entirely west of the 98th meridian, however, may take
hope from the following language:
The Western States' interests, and their asserted superior competence, in conserving and pre87. 102 S.Ct. at 3462 (citations omitted).
88. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
89. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333
(1977).
90. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
91. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.
92. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
93. 102 S.Ct. at 3465.
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serving scarce water resources are not irrelevant
in the Commerce Clause inquiry. Nor is appellee's
claim to public ownership without significance. Like
Congress' deference to state water law . . . these

factors inform the determination whether the burdens on commerce imposed by state ground water
regulation are reasonable or unreasonable ....

If

it could be shown that the State as a whole suffers
a water shortage, that the intrastate transportation
of water from areas of abundance to areas of shortage is feasible regardless of distance, and that the
importation of water from adjoining States would
roughly compensate for any exportation to those
States, then the conservation and preservation purpose might be credibly advanced for the reciprocity
provision. A demonstrably arid state conceivably
might be able to marshall evidence to establish a
close means-end relationship between even a total
ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to
conserve and preserve water."
Two of the three westerners on the Court, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist and Mine. Justice O'Connor, dissented. Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's point was that a groundwater right in Nebraska
was "only a usufructory right," so it could not be said that
('commerce' in groundwater exists as far as Nebraska is
concerned.""5 He distinguished Hughes as a case where the
state had allowed a natural resource to be reduced to private
possession:
By contrast, Nebraska so regulates groundwater that it cannot be said that the State permits
any "commerce," intrastate or interstate, to exist
in this natural resource. As with almost all of the
Western States, Nebraska does not recognize an
absolute ownership interest in groundwater, but
grants landowners only a right to use groundwater
on the land from which it has been extracted. Moreover, the landowner's right to use groundwater is
limited. Nebraska landowners may not extract
groundwater "in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use upon the land in which he owns, especially
94. Id. at 3463, 3465.
95. Id. at 3468-69.
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if such use is injurious to others who have substantial rights to the waters, and if the natural underground supply is insufficient for all owners, each
is entitled to a reasonable proportion of the whole."
With the exception of municipal water systems,
Nebraska forbids any transportation of groundwater off the land owned or controlled by the person who has apropriated the water from its subterranean source.90
Justice Rehnquist's argument is either based on a
fundamental misconception of the relationship between the
commerce clause and state property law or the Justice seeks
to return to the days when commerce clause law consisted of
fictions on fictions. His attempt to characterize the Nebraska
groundwater statute as exempt from the commerce clause
because the right to use has been limited, fails because the
analysis potentially applies to all common pool property
rights. Private rights to use common pool resources are,
of necessity, less complete that those in other resources, but
incomplete or shared rights are no less property because
they are "only ...

usufructory right[s]." °

Today all property rights, common pool or exclusive,
are limited by the state's exercise of its police powers. There
is no difference between a Nebraska groundwater right
limited to use on underlying land and a tract of fee simple
absolute land in Lincoln, the use of which is limited by a
stringent zoning ordinance that prevents a factory from
relocating there from out of state. In each case the issue is
the same: has the state enacted a law that is inconsistent
with the policies implicit in the negative commerce clause?
To use a more realistic example, surely a state could not
defend a statute prohibiting the burial of hazardous or lowlevel nuclear wastes simply because state law prohibited
the use of land for that purpose. The constitutional problem
cannot be simplified by adopting old categories of property
rights.
96. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted ) (quoting Olson v. City of
Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933)).
97. Id. at 3468.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/3

28

1983

Tarlock: So Its Not "Ours" - Why Can't We Still Keep It? - A First Look at
SPORHASE V. NEBRASKA

165

Moreover, the characterization of Nebraska water law
is too extreme. The state does not absolutely tie, as do some
appropriation states, a water right to the land. The meaning
of Olson v. City of Wahoo, cited by Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent, has long been disputed within the state. It is either
an adoption of the California correlative rights rule or it is
an adaptation of the modern rule of riparian rights that
allows non-riparian uses so long as other riparians are not
injured. Under either of these options, the result is not to
prohibit absolutely the use of groundwater on non-overlying
land. Rather, uses on overlying land are only given a preference over uses on non-overlying land. Finally, there is no
clear state administrative policy prohibiting groundwater
transfers."
F. Export Bans After Sporhase: Are All Bans Invalid?
What does Sporhase mean for other western state water
embargoes? Sporhase confirms the heavy burden states bear
to justify anti-slurry and related legislation. The states can
no longer claim that state trust ownership or other distinctive features of western water law allow the states to
unilaterally exclude water resources from commerce clause
scrutiny. It is equally clear that state trust ownership does
not give the states a tenth amendment claim that federal
intervention is inconsistent with essential attributes of state
sovereignty."9
The issue is whether the burden on interstate commerce
is impossible to justify, and, if it is, what other options
remain open to the state. The last question is answered
easily. Sporhase reaffirmed the principle of Prudential
Insurance Company v. Benjamin °° that Congress can exempt
state legislation from commerce clause review. The stan98. See Aiken, supra note 86, at 986-87. Nebraska is often described as a state
that does not permit transfers of water. The issue, however, is much more
complicated. See HUTCHINS, 1 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 463-66 (1971).
99. State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240, 1251-53 (8th Cir.
1981). But see Hellerstein, supra note 40, at 77. Compare, Varat, supra
note 74, at 556-57.
100. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

29

166

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 3
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XVIII

dards for congressional consent are strict"' and the limits
of Benjamin have never been defined, but political protection of their interests remains open to the western states.
To many, the availability of congressional relief, which
the western states have used effectively with respect to
water resources policy generally, is a sufficient answer to
state interests in export barriers. This is a powerful argument, but I think that Sporhase provides some basis for
concluding that a more strongly justified export ban might
be sustained absent congressional consent. In this final section, I will examine the impact of the decision on slurry
and other export bans and suggest the arguments that
might be open to the western states under a generous,
admittedly creative, reading of Sporhase.
1. The Per Se and Reciprocity Export Bans
Colorado, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, and Washington' have either per se or reciprocal export bans. All of
these statutes are presumptively invalid under Sporhase.
New Mexico, Nevada, and perhaps Colorado might be able
to argue that they suffer from a chronic statewide, as
opposed to a regional, water shortage. Montana's special
anti-slurry statute"0 ' does not discriminate on its face against
interstate commerce, but its discriminatory effect is clear
and it will probably be treated as a per se export ban under
Sporhase. The state will have trouble showing the compelling
statewide need for the water that was required by the
Court's opinion in Sporhase.
2. Legislative Approval
Oregon, South Dakota, and Wyoming"' require legislative approval for major interstate diversions. These statutes
do not per se discriminate against interstate commerce. In
101. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire- ........- U.S.

,

102 S.Ct. 1096

(1982).
102. See supra notes 25, 20, 19, 23 and 24.
103. See supra note 20. But see Comment, supra note 20, at 169 (which argues
that the statute should be sustained because "[t]he construction of one
slurry line could significantly interfere with alternative" future uses of
water).
104. See supra notes 28, 27 and 26.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss1/3

30

1983

Tarlock: So Its Not "Ours" - Why Can't We Still Keep It? - A First Look at
SPORHASE V. NEBRASKA

167

fact, they contemplate, at least on their face, substantial
interstate diversions. South Dakota might argue that its
system making state appropriations available for sale to
slurry pipelines and other energy developers' merely represents a decision by the state to enter the resource market and
capture for the public the benefits of state owned resources,
as in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,' where the Supreme Court held
that the state could give in-state residents a preference in
purchasing state-manufactured cement. This would be an
intriguing argument but its success is open to considerable
doubt. In Reeves, the Court went out of its way to distinguish cement from natural resources, especially scarce ones,
0 7
and the rationale for the decision is less than compelling.
The major problem that legislative approval schemes
face is that the statute that was invalidated in City of Altus
v. Carr conditioned out-of-state diversions on legislative
approval. At a minimum, the state has subjected out-of-state
users to higher standards than those required for in-state
users and the burden of justifying such discrimination requires a substantial, although not compelling, demonstration
of state interest.
105. South Dakota has adopted a water allocation scheme similar in concept
to the California State Water Plan for interstate energy diversions. The
State Board of Water and Natural Resources is authorized to apply to the
regulatory agency, the Water Management Board, for an appropriation
permit "to appropriate water for energy industry use for marketing to
energy industry users for such consideration and under such terms and
conditions as are fixed by contract or instrument of conveyance." S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 46-17-18.1 (Supp. 1982). State appropriation applications are exempt from both the legislative approval and due diligence
requirements of the general appropriation law. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§§ 46-5-20.1 and 21.1 (Supp. 1982). In effect, South Dakota is claiming
ownership of the water stored behind multipurpose dams on the Missouri
River and offering the water for sale to the highest bidder. Downstream
states have already threatened suit. The federal government's interest in
navigation and flood control is also a factor to be considered.
106. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
107. Varat, supra note 74, at 501-08. Professor Varat argues that the problem
of resident versus nonresident interests can be best addressed through a
theory of state citizenship derived from the privileges and immunities
clause. To Professor Varat, the real issue in Reeves is not the regulatoryproprietary distinction drawn by the Court, but whether the state's monopoly power was sufficient to require a non-discriminatory access policy.
Id. at 550-52. Some doctrinal justification for Reeves may be found in
Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), which
distinguished between fundamental and non-fundamental rights claimed by
out-of-state citizens.
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3. The Least Restrictive Alternative Hurdle
In short, the arid states' efforts to validate export bans
face a limited prospect for success. Money can make water
run up hill, but it is not clear that legal arguments can
accomplish the same result. Sporhase requires a close fit
between the statute and a narrow conservation and preservation rationale. One creative argument is that such laws,
as reverse quarantines, represent legitimate responses to
emergencies, but this is not likely to be accepted by the
Supreme Court after City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey.
New Jersey tried to justify a law banning out-of-state solid
wastes as a quarantine, but the seven member majority
rejected the characterization. The Court narrowly defined
quarantine as a situation where the articles had to be destroyed as soon as possible to prevent contagion and other
evils. The problem with New Jersey's law was:
There has been no claim here that the very movement of waste into or through New Jersey endangers health, or that waste must be disposed of as
soon and as close to its point of generation as possible. The harms caused by waste are said to arise
after its disposal in landfill sites, and at that point,
as New Jersey concedes, there is no basis to distinguish out-of-state waste from domestic waste. If
one is inherently harmful, so is the other. Yet New
Jersey has banned the former while leaving its
landfill sites open to the latter. °8
Perhaps, Montana's legislation, since the use of all water
for coal slurry is per se non-beneficial, might be presented
as an evenhanded reverse quarantine, but I doubt it.
The major barrier that states face is that export bans
are not the least discriminatory alternatives for conserving
water resources. An attorney for Energy Transportation
Systems, Incorporated has developed this argument at some
length, and it is a powerful one.0 9 On his list of nondiscriminatory alternatives are interstate compacts, denial of appro108. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 629 (1978).
109. Clyde, supra note 12, at 547-56 (emphasis in original).
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priations in the public interest, instream use appropriations
or reservations, and the imposition of conditions on the right
to change uses.
The force of the requirement that states seek the least
discriminatory means to achieve their ends, in the context
of western water law, is that it forces the states to accept
responsibility for something that they have been reluctant
to do for political reasons; that is, to use their broad powers
to allocate waters arising within their borders to further
state interests regardless of the effect on interstate commerce.
In Justice Stevens' majority opinion in Sporhase, he
went out of his way to confirm the power of states to act
solely in their self-interest. He spoke of a state's powers "to
conserve and preserve for its own citizens this vital resource
in times of severe shortage" and to give a "limited preference for its own citizens.... The opinion can be read as a
blueprint for the passage of laws that severely restrict access
to water generally but will survive a negative commerce
clause challenge. The statement "Obviously, a State that
imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own
citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce
when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water
out of the state,""' will, ironically, sustain much more severe
burdens on interstate commerce than those attempted by
Nebraska.
At the same time, Justice Stevens seemed to be counseling the states to avoid ad hoc, hasty legislative judgments
that are little more than a refusal to face the problem of
how change can be accommodated, and which have the highest
risk of offending the negative commerce clause. Instead,
Justice Stevens would advise the states to concentrate on the
development of balanced and comprehensive water policies.
There is much truth in Dean Trelease's warning that water
law alone should not be used to make decisions about regional
110. 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
111. ld.
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growth. The law ought to return to its traditional function
of setting the necessary conditions for the operation of the
market, which include the forced absorption of the major
external costs of reallocations."'
G. The Case for Export Bans After Sporhase
Despite the argument that export bans are not the least
restrictive means of conserving a state's water resources,
I think that there is still a role for them. The Court suggested
in Sporhase that export bans might be necessary to conserve
water in the arid west. In addition, bans could be analogized
to interim zoning ordinances. A ban does not reflect a determination to preserve forever the status quo, but instead
represents an effort by a state to buy breathing time in
order to make more rational allocation decisions.
That argument was made and rejected in City of Philadelphia, but that case should not be viewed as dispositive of
this argument. New Jersey tried to characterize its import
ban statute as an effort to preserve existing in-state landfill
capacity until the technology of waste management became
more developed, so that the state might be able to avoid
dedicating critical areas such as wetlands to waste disposal.
The Court conceded that it might be proper for a state to
slow "the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be
affected.""' The rub was that the New Jersey statute discriminated against out-of-state wastes. Out-of-state commercial interests bore "the full burden of conserving the
State's remaining landfill space.""' In addition, New Jersey's legislative justification seemed post hoc.
The interim zoning ordinance analogy would be stronger
if the current balancing test were replaced by an analysis
that asks a different, more relevant question. Under the
Pike balancing test the relevant factors are the evenhanded112. Trelease, Water Law, Policies, and Politics: Institutions for Decision
Making 199 in WESTERN WATER RESOURCES: COMING PROBLEMS AND THE
POLICY ALTERNATIVES (1980).
113. 437 U.S. at 626.
114. Id. at 628.
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ness of the statute, the relationship between the local interest
and its impact on interstate commerce, and the feasibility
of a less discriminatory alternative. This test is nothing
more than a restatement of the much discredited, although
occasionally revived, substantive due process approach. All
of the faults of substantive due process can be found in the
Pike approach.
A better approach would be to focus on the relationship
between the state regulation and the likely risk of a malfunction in the political process. This approach is not unique
to me and was inspired by Dean John Hart Ely's much discussed and controversial book, Democracy and Distrust."'
Dean Ely mounts a defense of judicial review to protect
those who are most likely to be the victims of majority
control of legislative and administrative process. The use
of the negative commerce clause to invalidate discriminatory
legislation is a classic example of Ely's right-to-participate
theory because in-state interests have failed to provide sufficient protection to voteless out-of-state interests. " 6 The
experience of many western water allocation conflicts suggests that the above test would not require judicial review
for much water legislation. Often there is no denial of access
to the political process at either the local or national level.
Thus, the relevance of Ely's process-based approach for
western water law is that it suggests a case against judicial
interference in water allocation choices when the risks of a
malfunction in the political process are low.
If a court did as suggested above, and examined the
impact of the regulation on the challenger in terms of the
disproportionate impact on non-represented interests and
the likelihood of state or national legislative redress, statutes
such as Wyoming's statute might pass muster. It is true that
the statute imposes much of the cost of Wyoming's decision
to preserve its waters for non-coal slurry uses on out-ofstate citizens, but the state has expressly opened its legislature to these citizens to make the case for the use of water
115.

J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).

116. Id. at 84.
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for this purpose. The legislature has not simply been used
as a conduit for allowing in-state interests to gain a competitive advantage over out-of-state interests, which is the
case in the usual negative commerce clause case.
Furthermore, if, as proponents claim, slurry pipelines
are an essential element of national energy policy, then
congressional relief is a real possibility."' The fact that
Congress has considered legislation to give pipelines the
right of eminent domain despite objections from the railroads, but to date has refused to preempt state water rights
suggests that judicial intervention is not necessary to prevent economic balkanism. It is proper for courts to continue to inquire whether interim bans on the use of water
for slurry are acceptable in light of less discriminatory alternatives, but the argument that such alternatives exist under
traditional water law ought to have less force here because
of the easy access to both the state and national political
process."'
There is some justification for the continued use of the
negative commerce clause to invalidate low-visibility encroachments on the national interest. However, I think that
there is a valid distinction between low-visibility state regulations that do no more than favor local interests at the
expense of interstate or national interests and state actions
that are grounded in the protection of traditional interests,
such as water allocation. The latter are entitled to a greater
presumption of constitutionality because of the lower risk
of a malfunction of the political process. There is still a
role for judicial invalidation of low-visibility state regulations that impede national markets; the possibility of congressional preemption, no matter how remote, it not a reason
for the Court to abdicate its traditional commerce clause
role." 9 This caveat aside, statutes that seek to advance legitimate state interests and do more than interfere with the
operation of the market by conferring a competitive advan117. See Comment, supra note 20.
118. See Eule, supra note 75, at 460-68.
119. Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart
Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
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tage on in-state interests at the expense of out-of-state interests are entitled to greater deference by the courts regardless of the effect on interstate commerce. 2 ° This is especially
true if the national interest is nothing more than an abstract
notion of free trade.
This standard would not apply to the Nebraska statute
invalidated in Sporhase, but might apply to coal slurry bans.
In the second case, especially where energy policy is at issue,
state decisions are likely to command a prominent place on
both the local and national political agenda, and the possibility of political relief is a real, rather than a theoretical,
possibility. The danger of politicizing water law still exists,
but legislatures retain a marginal comparative advantage
over courts to do inter-regional equity, if that is required.
Because of the potential for abuse, the state ought to carry
the burden of explaining the purpose of its statute and of
demonstrating the likelihood of effective non-judicial relief.' 2 '
H. Conclusion
This article has suggested a major revision in the
Supreme Court's use of the negative commerce clause in
order to protect the flexibility of the western states to allocate their water resources. Perhaps my arguments can be
dismissed as special pleading, but they are grounded in a
deep respect for the positive role that western water law
has long played in shaping the development of the region. To
allow the states to continue to play this role, courts need to
avoid formulating too many hard and fast rules about the
duty to share scarce waters among interested states. Exist120. But see Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role of the Federal
Courts, 6 HAEv. ENVTL. L. Rav. 241, 248 (1982). Professor Stewart
observes:
The judicial ban on discriminatory state taxes and regulations,
like the per se rule against price fixing, has the virtue of simplicity. There are few instances where discriminatory state
measures accomplish anything beyond transferring wealth from
one state to another, and the effort to identify the exceptions to
the rule is likely to cost more than it is worth.
(footnote omitted).
121. The challenger bears the burden of presenting a prima facie case which
includes a showing of disproportionate impact, but a court can best avoid
the dangerous plunge into the motives by shifting the burden of justifying
the statute to the state. Eule, supra note 75, at 471.
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ing principles of law provide a sufficient context for the
political process to function to determine inter-regional
equity issues. While the courts may be the proper forum for
deciding questions relating to train lengths, mudguard standards, and apple labelling, the political process is, in my
opinion, the superior mechanism, though perhaps only marginally so, for resolving inter-regional equity debates over
water allocation.
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